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INTRODUCTION
It was a simple case. 1 During a search incident to arrest for an
unrelated parole violation, the arresting officer found a wrapped
1. This comment was inspired by watching a jury trial during my first
internship as a law student in which defense counsel argued for jury nullification.
2
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substance on the arrestee that field-tested positive for heroin. The
arrestee was subsequently charged with misconduct involving a
controlled substance. 2 The substance found looked like heroin and
smelled like heroin, and the crime lab confirmed the substance was, in
fact, heroin. However, when the defendant's attorney stood up to give
his closing argument, he did not talk about the law, the prosecution's
burden of proof, nor the presumption of innocence. Instead, he talked
about growing up in a small southern town and going to the fair with
his dad. He recalled seeing a large elephant loosely tied to a small
stake.
The assistant district attorney objected, knowing the story and the
metaphor it represented, as this was not the first time the defense
attorney had tried to use this closing argument. The prosecutor knew
the attorney was going to tell the jurors that they were in the same
position as the elephant. Just as the elephant was strong enough to pull
up the stake, the jury was strong enough to reject the law and not be
held down by the jury instructions. The jurors had the ultimate power
to acquit, regardless of the evidence. The defense attorney wanted the
jurors to ignore their oaths and the law, and ultimately acquit his
client. This was a jury nullification argument.
Encouraging jurors to ignore the law is a destructive practice in
criminal trials because it impedes the fair administration of justice.3
Making jury nullification arguments during trial improperly
encourages jurors to ignore their oaths and legislate from the jury box,
which is outside the scope of the jury's role in the criminal justice
system, undermines the judicial process, and actually impedes the
reformation of unjust laws.4 Therefore, the rules of professional
Special thanks to W. Mike Perry, an assistant district attorney and the prosecuting
attorney for the trial described in the Introduction. The anecdote and facts from this
trial are drawn from my own knowledge and memory as I personally witnessed the
entire trial.
2. ALASKA STAT. § 11.71.040(a)(3) (2016).
3. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, A Brief History of the Criminal Jury in the
United States, 61 U. CHI. L. REv. 867, 889-90 (1994) (discussing the importance of
impaneling impartial jurors during the American Civil Rights era to ensure that the
fate of African-American defendants would not be left in the "the hands of [their]
enemies" (internal citations omitted)).
4. See Part V, infra.
[Vol. 52
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conduct should be amended to hold attorneys accountable for
encouraging jury nullification.
To begin, Part I of this comment describes the history and purpose
of jury trials. Part II discusses the varying definitions of "jury
nullification" in academic literature and case law, and then defines
how the term will be used in this comment. Part III discusses the
jury's inherent power to nullify and various judicial attempts to curb
that power. Part IV addresses current arguments for jury nullification
as a response to unjust laws. Part V explains that jury nullification
arguments are always improper, regardless of motive, because they
permit lawyers to present irrelevant arguments that attempt to
undermine our system of checks and balances. Part VI recommends
that the rules of professional conduct be amended to expressly prohibit
jury nullification arguments. Lastly, Part VII offers a brief conclusion.
I. THE HISTORY AND PURPOSE OF TRIALS BY JURY
A. Trial by Jury as a Fundamental Right
The right to have criminal guilt determined by an impartial jury
can be found in the main body of the United States Constitution5 as
well as in the Bill of Rights.6 However, the right to trial by jury was
not a novel idea when the Constitution and Bill of Rights were
ratified.7 The United States inherited the concept, and many other
political philosophies, from its English ancestry.8
In 1215, with the signing of the Magna Carta, English barons
gained the right to have their peers determine matters which would
result in imprisonment. 9 While this right did not extend to English
commoners, the signing of the Magna Carta was an important step
towards establishing a rule of law beyond the arbitrary whims of the
5. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 ("the Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of
Impeachment, shall be by Jury") (capitalization in original).
6. U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury").
7. AKHIL REED AMAR & LES ADAMS, THE BILL OF RIGHTS PRIMER 2 (2013).
8. Id.
9. MAGNACARTA, para. 29 (Eng. 1215).
4
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King.' 0 Several hundred years later, in 1628, King Charles I signed the
Petition of Right declaring the rule of law as supreme over the wishes
of the King.'1 Soon after that, Parliament passed the English Bill of
Rights, in part seeking to curb abuses of the jury system by declaring
that jurors "be duly impaneled and returned."' 12
An early English case, known as Bushell's Case, further
strengthened the role of the jury by protecting jurors from judicial
intervention and punishment. 13 In Bushell's Case, William Penn and
William Mead were prosecuted for practicing a religion different than
the Anglican religion of the Church of England. 4 Contrary to the
wishes of the judge, the jury refused to convict, and every juror was
subsequently jailed for contempt. 15 Upon a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus, the reviewing judge ruled that "no juror could be
punished for rendering a verdict contrary to the court's opinion."' 6
Bushell's Case paved the way for jury nullification within the English
system, which included colonial America, by protecting jurors from
judicial retribution following the rendering of their verdicts. 7
When English colonists first came to the New World, they came
with the promise that they would retain the same rights guaranteed to
all Englishmen, including the right to trial by jury.' 8 However, this
turned out to be a hollow promise.1 9 Despite the guarantee of the right
to trial by jury, the application of the right was inconsistent; some
colonies offered jury trials more often than others, and some crimes
were simply more likely to be tried by juries than others. 20 Even when
10. AKHIL REED AMAR & LES ADAMS, THE BILL OF RIGHTS PRIMER 7-8
(2013).
11. Id. at 10.
12. Avalon Project, English Bill of Rights 1689, YALE LAW SCHOOL,
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th-century/england.asp (2008).
13. Kenneth Duvall, The Contradictory Stance on Jury Nullification, 88 N.
DAK. L. REv. 409, 412 (2012) (citing Bushell's Case (1610) 124 Eng. Rep. 1006).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id; United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1130 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
17. Duvall, supra note 13.
18. See generally DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776).
19. See DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776) ("The history of the
present King of Great Britain is a history of repeated injuries and usurpations").
20. Alschuler, supra note 3, at 872 n.17.
[Vol. 52
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juries were impaneled, they would often apply the law inconsistently
- juries would often nullify charges brought against those who
resisted English authority. 21 In response, England expanded the
jurisdiction of admiralty courts, where the right to trial by jury was not
guaranteed.22
The English run-around of the right to trial by jury became one of
the sparks that ignited the American Revolution. 23 In fact, "depriving
[the colonists] in many cases, of the benefits of Trial by Jury" was one
of the specific grievances listed by the founding fathers in the
Declaration of Independence.24 The founding fathers believed that the
right to trial by jury was an essential element of a fair and just judicial
system. 2' As it happens, safeguarding the right to trial by jury was one
of the few issues the Federalists and Anti-Federalists agreed upon at
the Constitutional Convention in 1787.26
B. Scope of the Jury's Power
Crucial to the argument over jury nullification is the question of
whether it is within the scope of a jury's power to determine questions
of law as well as questions of fact. Historically, juries could consider
both.27 However, as the American legal system developed and the
people placed more confidence in trained judges, this standard
evolved:
As the distrust of judges appointed and removable by the king
receded, there came increasing acceptance that under a republic the
protection of citizens lay not in recognizing the right of each jury to
21. Id. at 874.
22. Id. at 875.
23. Id.
24. DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, para. 3 (U.S. 1776).
25. Alschuler, supra note 3, at 871.
26. Id. (quoting Federalist 83 (Alexander Hamilton) ("The friends and
adversaries of the plan of the convention, if they agree on nothing else, concur at
least in the value set upon the trial by jury")).
27. Lawrence W. Crispo, Jury Nullification: Law versus Anarchy, 31 LOY.
L.A. L. REv. 1, 8 (1997).
6
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make its own law, but in following democratic processes for
changing the law.2
8
In 1835, a federal court in Massachusetts decided United States v.
Battiste.29 The court in Battiste recognized that jurors have the power
to nullify but rejected the idea that jurors "have the moral right to
decide the law according to their own notions, or pleasure." 30 In other
words, jury nullification is the exercise of a power but not a right.3
The court reasoned that if the jury would be free to determine the
validity of the law as well as the facts, the law itself would be
uncertain. 32 The jury would make the law, but no court would have the
ability or power to review that law, thereby leaving little protection
from rogue juries.3 3 On the other hand, when the law is determined by
the court and not by individual jurors, redress and review are available
in cases of error. 34 The court emphasized that such a review process is
critical to ensuring a fair criminal justice system, and further
emphasized that the review process is unavailable when a jury
nullifies.35
In 1895, the United States Supreme Court decided the seminal
case of Sparf v. United States.36 In Sparf, the defendant was charged
with felonious murder on the high seas. 37 He was ultimately convicted
and sentenced to death.38 At trial, the judge had declined to offer a
jury instruction on manslaughter, ruling that the evidence was
insufficient to support a conviction on the reduced crime. 39 The judge
instructed the jury that the accused was either to be convicted or
acquitted of the crime charged and no other.40 A post-verdict
28. United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1132 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
29. United States v. Battiste, 24 F. Cas. 1042 (Mass. 1835).






36. Sparfv. United States, 156 U.S. 51 (1895).
37. Id. at 52.
38. Id.
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discussion with the jury revealed that several jurors had wanted to
convict the defendant of manslaughter in lieu of murder.41 These
jurors were concerned the defendant would be sentenced to death, a
sentence they did not want imposed on the defendant.4 2 On appeal,
Sparf argued that the jury should have received an instruction on the
lesser charge of manslaughter. 43 In affirming the conviction, Justice
Harlan wrote, "Congress did not intend to invest juries in criminal
cases with power arbitrarily to disregard the evidence and principles
of law applicable to the case on trial."44 According to the Court, the
purpose of giving instructions on lesser offenses is so that juries can
consider lesser charges when the evidence permits.45 Instructions on
lesser offenses are not meant to be used by jurors to arbitrarily apply
the law as a means of shortening a defendant's sentence.46 Both
Battiste and Sparf support the notion that questions of law should
remain in the hands of the court, not the jury.47
Juries serve a distinct purpose in the course of a criminal trial.4 s
Essentially, every criminal prosecution consists of two inquiries: (1)
whether there is a law governing the alleged conduct, and (2) whether
the accused actually violated that law.49 The first is a question of law
requiring a certain knowledge of the law and judicial process.5 ° The
second is a question of fact that can be decided simply with
knowledge of the evidence and an understanding of the everyday
affairs of reasonable people.51 In 1855, when discussing the delineated
roles between judge and jury, Chief Justice Shaw of the Massachusetts
Supreme Court eloquently noted that:
41. Id. at 62 n.1.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 53.
44. Id. at 63.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 63-64.
47. United States v. Battiste, 24 F. Cas. 1042, 1043 (Mass. 1835); Sparf v.
United States, 156 U.S. 51, 63 (1895).
48. See Commonwealth v. Anthes, 71 Mass. 185, 198 (5 Gray 185) (1855).
49. Commonwealth v. Anthes, 71 Mass. 185, 192 (5 Gray 185) (1855).
50. Id. at 192-93.
51. Id. at 193.
169
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[T]he true glory and excellence of the trial by jury is this; that the
power of deciding fact and law is wisely divided; that the authority
to decide questions of law is placed in a body well qualified, by a
suitable course of training, to decide all questions of law; and
another body, Well qualified for the duty, is charged with deciding
all questions of fact, definitively; and whilst each, within its own
sphere, performs the duty entrusted to it, such a trial affords the best
possible security for a safe administration of justice and the security
of public and private rights.
52
Chief Justice Shaw recognized the importance of applying the law
uniformly, and thus concluded that it is only appropriate to afford
juries the power to determine questions of fact, while allowing
questions of law to remain in the hands of trained judges.5 3
II. DEFINING "JURY NULLIFICATION"
Jury nullification is a relatively simple notion, but in practice it
has many nuanced definitions. 54 Black's Law Dictionary defines jury
nullification as:
[A] jury's knowing and deliberate rejection of the evidence or
refusal to apply the law either because the jury wants to send a
message about some social issue that is larger than the case itself or
because the result dictated bZ, law is contrary to the jury's sense of
justice, morality, or fairness. !
It should be noted that jury nullification is not synonymous with
acquittal. A jury does not nullify when it acquits due to mistake or
insufficiencies in the prosecution's case. 56 Such acquittals are not the
same as nullification; nullification requires a subjective intent by
jurors to reject the law being applied to the specific facts of a case.5 7
52. Id. at 198.
53. Id. at 191.
54. See Nancy S. Marder, The Myth of the Nullifying Jury, 93 Nw. U. L. REv.
877, 878 (1999) ("the press used the term [jury nullification] so loosely that it came
to mean any verdict with which the press and public disagree").
55. Jury Nullification, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
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One commentator noted that academics and theorists favor jury
nullification more than judges,58 and as a result, the term's definition
may vary depending on the level of reverence or disdain that is felt for
the practice. Legal scholars commonly describe jury nullification as a
moral practice; they consider jury nullification an act of mercy59 and
argue that it allows jurors to render a "verdict[ ] of conscience" 60 and
employ their own community values.61 Under certain circumstances,
other scholars view jury nullification as a moral responsibility, 62
arguing that it protects the personal integrity of jurors by allowing
them to do what they believe is just, regardless of the law.63
In contrast, judges commonly define jury nullification as a
lawless, anarchical practice. 64 In United States v. Dougherty, Judge
Leventhal wrote, "jury nullification is put forward in the name of
liberty and democracy, but its explicit avowal risks the ultimate logic
of anarchy." 65 In United States v. Moylan, Judge Sobeloff wrote, "No
legal system could long survive if it gave every individual the option
of disregarding with impunity any law which by his personal standard
was judged morally untenable. Toleration of such conduct would not
be democratic, as appellants claim, but inevitably anarchic." 66 Many
judges recognize that the practice allows a criminally accused's fate to
be determined by the whims of jurors and not by'a good faith effort to
apply the law.
67
58. Darryl K. Brown, Jury Nullification Within The Rule Of Law, 81 MINN. L.
REv. 1149,1150 (1997).
59. David C. Brody, Sparf and Dougherty Revisited. Why the Court Should
Instruct the Jury of its Nullification Right, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 89, 91 (1995).
60. Arie M. Rubenstein, Note, Verdicts of Conscience: Nullification and the
Modern Jury Trial, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 959 (2006).
61. Andrew J. Parmenter, Note, Nullifying the Jury: "The Judicial Oligarchy"
Declares War on Jury Nullification, 46 WASHBURN L. J. 379, 421 (2007).
62. See Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the
Criminal Justice System, 105 YALE L. J. 677, 679 (1995).
63. Parmenter, supra note 61, at 427.
64. United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1133 (D.C. Cir. 1972); United
States v. Moylan, 417 F.2d 1002, 1009 (4th Cir. 1969).
65. Dougherty, 473 F.2d at 1133.
66. Moylan, 417 F.2d at 1009.
67. People v. Williams, 21 P.3d 1209, 1223 (Cal. 2001).
10
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For this comment, jury nullification is defined as a jury's
intentional rejection of evidence proving guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt in order to acquit the defendant for some reason other than the
prosecution's failure to meet the burden of proof. This definition
covers the requisite specific intent and omits acquittals based on
mistake or misunderstanding, as well as justified, proper acquittals
based on insufficient evidence. 6
8
III. COURT RESPONSES TO JURY NULLIFICATION
Jury nullification ultimately exists in the "twilight" between
judicial condemnation and permission - judges strongly denounce
the practice but are unable to control it.69 As discussed in Part II,
Bushell's Case set precedent prohibiting the punishment of jurors for
their verdicts.7" Despite this prohibition, many judges have discovered
ways to avoid the excessive exercise of jury nullification without truly
invading the secrecy of jury deliberations. 7 1 Courts have generally
invalidated the practice of jury nullification by refusing to grant
requests for nullification instructions, refusing to consider nullification
when granting post-conviction relief, and removing nullifying jurors
for cause.
72
It is important to note that judges cannot directly prohibit jury
nullification. 73 While an impartial jury is fundamental to a fair trial,
the court has little power to ensure impartiality once the jury has been
impaneled.74 The protection given to jurors in Bushell's Case
highlights the importance of minimizing judicial interference with
juries and their deliberations. 75  If jurors feel the court is
micromanaging their deliberations, any decision rendered by the jury
68. See Marder, supra note 54, at 882-83.
69. Duvall, supra note 13, at 414.
70. Id. at 412.
71. Id. at415.
72. Id.
73. United States v. Thomas, 116 F.3d 606, 616 (2d Cir. 1997); Marder, supra
note 52, at 881-82.
74. Thomas, 116 F.3d at 608; People v. Williams, 21 P.3d 1209, 1214 (Cal.
2001).
75. See generally Bushell's Case (1610) 124 Eng. Rep. 1006.
[Vol. 52
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will be tainted by the court's interference, which ultimately infringes
upon the defendant's right to a fair trial.76
Jury nullification then, in the words of Justice Learned Hand, is
"the assumption of a power which [the jurors] had no right to
exercise."'77 The power the jury has to nullify was never an explicit
right, but one derived from several protections afforded the criminally
accused, such as the jury's right to reach a verdict without
explanation.78 In criminal trials, there are limited circumstances when
the judge can overrule a guilty verdict, but a judge can never force a
conviction after a jury renders a verdict of not guilty.79 In that context,
jury nullification is not an enforceable right but a secondary effect of
other rights.
However, judges are not powerless to combat "this so-called
right.",80 Courts can minimize the reach of jury nullification by
refusing to include a jury instruction that outlines the jury's power to
nullify.81 Explicitly informing the jury of the power to nullify through
an instruction could encourage "the substitution of individual
standards for openly developed community rules," resulting in lawless
verdicts and a denial of due process.
82
Further instruction on jury nullification is ultimately unnecessary
because jurors already know that they are never required to render a
guilty verdict.83 It is presumed that jurors understand and follow jury
instructions. 84 The instructions include permissive language regarding
conviction; even if juries believe all elements of a particular crime
have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, jurors are only
76. E.g., Bushell's Case (1610) 124 Eng. Rep. 1006 (the result of an acquittal
was imprisonment for the jurors).
77. Steckler v. United States, 7 F. 2d 59, 60 (2d Cir. 1925); Dunn v. United
States, 284 U.S. 390, 393 (1932) (Justice Holmes writing for the majority);
Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10, 23 (1980); Thomas, 116 F. 3d at 615.
78. Williams, 21 P.3d 1209, 1215.
79. Thomas, 116 F.3d at 616; Marder, supra note 54, at 881-82.
80. United States v. Dougherty, 473 F. 2d 1113, 1133 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
81. See United States v. Washington, 705 F.2d 489, 494 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
82. Id.
83. Dougherty, 473 F.2d at 1135.
84. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 695 (1984).
12
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instructed that they may convict.85 Jurors are never instructed under
any circumstances that they must convict.
86
In post-conviction proceedings, courts will not assume a jury was
willing to nullify but did not do so because they were not informed of
such power.87 This argument often arises in situations where a
defendant claims ineffective assistance of counsel based on defense
counsel's failure to argue for jury nullification. 88 However, failing to
argue for jury nullification cannot be considered when determining the
effectiveness of counsel. 89 In determining whether to grant post-
conviction relief based on attorney error, the court must presume
judges and jurors acted in accordance with the law.90 A defendant is
not entitled "to the luck of a lawless decision maker," 91 so the mere
possibility of a jury nullifying is not enough to affect the outcome of
his or her trial. The very nature of jury nullification requires jurors to
ignore the jury instructions given to them before deliberation. If the
presumption is the jury followed the law, the presumption is also the
jury would not nullify if informed of such power.
Voir dire, a French term meaning "to speak the truth," is the
process used to select an impartial jury and is a fundamental
component of a fair trial.92 While the accused is entitled to a fair trial,
so too are the people, as represented by the prosecutor. 93 When a
prospective juror expresses his or her intention to nullify during voir
dire, before any evidence has been presented, he or she has admitted
to being unable to impartially evaluate the case. By definition, a
85. Dougherty, 473 F. 2d. at 1135.
86. Id.
87. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 695 (1984).
88. See id. at 668.
89. Id. at 695 ("an assessment of the likelihood of a result more favorable to
the defendant must exclude the possibility of arbitrariness, whimsy, caprice,
'nullification,' and the like").
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Crispo, supra note 27, at 41.
93. Levine v. U.S. District Court, 764 F.2d 590, 596-97 (9th Cir. 1985). While
the prosecution does not have a Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial, there is a
"fundamental interest of the government and the public in insuring the integrity of
the judicial process. Society has the right to expect that the judicial system will be
fair and impartial to all who come before it." Id.
[Vol. 52
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prospective juror who expresses his intention to nullify by
disregarding judicial instructions has admitted his inability to perform
the duties of a juror.94 Expressing the intent to nullify during voir dire
is analogous to expressing the intent or tendency to convict, despite
the presumption of innocence. Thus, attorneys and judges are justified
in excusing jurors who demonstrate their intention to nullify during
voir dire.95
A juror who expresses his intention to nullify may also be excused
for cause after the jury is impaneled but before a verdict is reached. 96
Dismissing a juror after deliberations has begun is not the preferred
procedure, but it is not an abuse of judicial discretion to do so.97 In
fact, it would be a "dereliction of duty for a judge to remain
indifferent to reports" of jurors refusing to follow their oaths during
the course of a trial.98 Judges have to question jurors individually and
delicately so as to gain sufficient information as to the juror in
question, but not so far as to influence the deliberations.99 Presiding
judges can, and should, substitute a juror who is "unable to perform or
disqualified from performing their duties," including those jurors who
refuse to apply the law after taking an oath to do so. 100 Therefore, an
expressed intention to nullify is just cause for excusing a juror at any
point during the trial process up until the verdict is rendered.101
IV. REBUTTING ARGUMENTS FOR JURY NULLIFICATION
On a more abstract level, arguing for jury nullification does not
only encourage jurors to render verdicts based on morality and
fairness, as proponents commonly argue. Jury nullification arguments
also allow attorneys to play to the prejudices and biases inherent in
94. See People v. Williams, 21 P.3d 1209, 1213 (Cal. 2001); United States v.
Thomas, 116 F.3d 606, 608 (2d Cir. 1997).
95. Crispo, supra note 27, at 42.
96. Thomas, 116 F.3d at 614; United States v. Patterson, 587 Fed. Appx. 878,
889 (6th Cir. 2014) cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 33 (2015).
97. United States v. Geffrard, 87 F.3d 448, 452 (1 1th Cir. 1996).
98. Thomas, 116 F.3d at 616.
99. See, e.g., id. at 610-11 (describing the in camera interviews conducted to
determine the prudence of removing Juror No. 5).
100. Id. at 617 (quoting FED. R. CRIM. PROC. 24).
101. See id.
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every person. This makes it necessary to address and rebut common
justifications for jury nullification arguments. These justifications tend
to fall into two categories: (1) contesting specific laws and how they
are applied to a specific defendant, 10 2 and (2) preemptively contesting
the forthcoming sentence resulting from a conviction.10 3
A. The Zenger Effect: Jury Nullification in Response
to Contested Laws
Proponents of nullification commonly support their position by
citing cases where nullification achieved a sympathetic result, such as
the 1735 seditious libel trial of Peter Zenger, where the jury refused to
convict Zenger for voicing criticism of the Crown, 10 4 and various 19th
century prosecutions under the fugitive slave laws, where juries
refused to convict those aiding escaped slaves flee the South.'05 These
cases involved the types of moral dilemmas that proponents argue are
the very reasons juries should have the power to nullify. "6
Peter Zenger was charged with seditious libel for criticizing the
Governor of New York, who was appointed by the King of
England. 10 7 It is important to note that at the time of Zenger's trial,
judges would determine whether a statement was libelous.'0 8 If the
judge found the statement to be libelous, the jury would then
determine if the defendant published the statement.10 9 Truth was not a
defense to libel, and Zenger's attorney, Andrew Hamilton, was
ordered not to argue that it was.1 10 Instead, Hamilton urged the jurors
to reach their conclusion based on their collective consciences, and
decide for themselves whether the statements were libelous,
102. See infra Part IV.A.
103. See infra Part IV.B.
104. Dougherty, F. 2d at 1130; Alschuler, supra note 3, at 872.
105. United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1130 (D.C. Cir. 1972); see
Aaron McKnight, Comment, Jury Nullification as a Tool to Balance the Demands of
Law and Justice, 2013 B.Y.U. L. REv. 1103, 1107 (2013).
106. See People v. Williams, 21 P.3d 1209, 1214 (Cal. 2001).
107. Alschuler, supra note 3, at 872 (the Governor had fired Lewis Morris, a
judge, and Morris hired Zenger as editor and printer of a new journal).
108. Id. at 873.




Del Frate: The Elephant in the Room: Attorney Accountability for Jury Nullif
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2015
2016] JURY NULLIFICATION ARGUMENTS IN CRIMINAL TRIALS 177
notwithstanding the fact that the court had already made this
finding."' In other words, Hamilton argued for jury nullification, and
the jury ultimately acquitted Zenger of the charges against him.11 2 It is
important to reiterate that the Zenger trial was held in 1735, before the
Revolutionary War and before the signing of the United States
Constitution.'13 While jury nullification was arguably justified at the
time because the colonists did not benefit from any protections
equivalent to those eventually guaranteed by the First Amendment,
today, Zenger would not be guilty of any crime. 114 For this reason,
Zenger's trial is a relatively outdated example of an arguably justified
use of jury nullification." 5
The Zenger court was not the last to balance jury nullification and
free speech. 116 At the very heart of the Zenger argument advocating
for jury nullification was political dissention. 1 17 One of the most
polarizing political issues of the twentieth century was the Vietnam
War, which came with mounting anti-war demonstrations and an
increase in judicial review of the jury nullification issue. 18 In the
1960s and 1970s, the United States Circuit Courts of Appeals heard
numerous cases involving the burning of draft cards as well as other
protest-related crimes. 1
9
In 1969, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals decided United
States v. Moylan,120 which involved nine defendants who had been
111. Id.
112. See Alschuler, supra note 3, at 873.
113. See U.S. CONST. art. VII.
114. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
115. Cf United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1132 (D.C. Cir. 1972)
("[T]he judges in the courts were not the colonial appointees projecting royalist
patronage and influence but were themselves part and parcel of the nation's
intellectual mainstream, subject to the checks of the common law tradition and
professional opinion, and capable, in Roscoe Pound's words, of providing true
judicial justice standing in contrast with the colonial experience") (internal
quotations omitted).
116. See Crispo, supra note 27, at 12-16.
117. See Alschuler, supra note 3, at 872-73 (Zenger's paper "was the first
journal of political criticism in America" when the "well-established rule was: The
greater the truth, the greater the libel").
118. See Crispo, supra note 27, at 12.
119. Id. at 12-16.
120. United States v. Moylan, 417 F.2d 1002 (4th Cir. 1969).
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convicted of various crimes relating to the burning of Selective
Service files with homemade napalm.12 ' The defendants, "men and
women of sincere and strong commitments," admitted committing the
acts but characterized them as a protest against the Vietnam War.1 22
The defendants challenged their convictions based on the district
court's refusal to give a jury nullification instruction, and the court's
refusal to allow defense counsel to argue for jury nullification. 123 The
court, relying on Sparf v. United States, held that while the jury had
the power to nullify, it would be improper to explicitly inform them of
such power and that the attorneys had no right to dispute the law as
given by the court in front of the jury. 124 After Moylan, federal courts
consistently rejected the notion that jurors were entitled to be
informed of their power to nullify charges. 125
Proponents also point to nullification as a response to the law
itself, instead of just the law's application. 126 For example, the
Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 criminalized assisting escaped slaves
avoid capture.' 27 During the mid-nineteenth century, more and more
Northerners began to oppose slavery, and when impaneled to hear
Fugitive Slave Act cases, would often nullify the charges against those
who had harbored escaped slaves. 128 Many abolitionists reasoned that
slavery was morally wrong, and therefore, people should not be
punished for assisting slaves reach freedom. 129
121. Id. at 1003.
122. Id. In a parallel argument challenging the sufficiency of the jury
instruction defining "willfully," the defendants characterized their motive in burning
the files as "good," because they were protesting a war they sincerely believed was
illegal and immoral. Id. at 1004.
123. Id. at 1004.
124. Id. at 1007.
125. Crispo, supra note 27, at 16 (citing United States v. Wiley, 503 F.2d. 106,
107 (8th Cir. 1974)).
126. Rubenstein, supra note 60, at 972-73.
127. Compromise of 1850, 31st Cong. Page 464 § 7 (1850)
http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/ampage?collld=llsl&fileName=009/llsl009.db&rec
Num=491.
128. Mary Claire Mulligan, Jury Nullification: Its History and Practice, COLO.
LAW., December 2004, at 73.
129. McKnight, supra note 105, at 1115.
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Hindsight accepts this justification because of the obvious
immorality surrounding the institution of slavery. 130 However, jury
nullification has not always been supported by such levels of moral
justification.13 ' After the Civil War, Southern juries would often
nullify charges in cases where white defendants were accused of
perpetrating crimes against African-Americans.
132
There seems to be an assumption by jury nullification advocates
that juries will only practice nullification in ways that they, the
advocates, would consider morally acceptable, such as in the cases of
seditious libel and violations of fugitive slave laws. 133 However, this
has not always been the case. One commentator noted:
The complaints of federal authorities concerning Southern jury
nullification following the Civil War resembled the complaints of
Southern authorities concerning Northern jury nullification before
the War and the complaints of English authorities concerning jury
nullification in the colonial period. Southern juries, however,
appeared to be nullifying laws against personal violence rather than
laws requiring cooperation in returning escaped slaves or paying
duties imposed by an unrepresentative government. 134
One court, also noted how the moral standard guiding jury
nullification was also diminished in the cases where juries nullified
alcohol related charges during Prohibition, and more generally in
cases of heat-of-passion crimes. 
135
There is no way to predict why jurors might choose to nullify, and
therefore no way to ensure jury nullification occurs for some
justifiable, moral reason akin to the justifications in the Zenger or
Fugitive Slave Act trials. Permitting arguments for jury nullification
allows attorneys to prey on the prejudices and biases of jurors as well
as their internal senses of morality. Because jury nullification can
occur for both moral and immoral reasons, attorneys should not be
allowed to encourage jury nullification.
130. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
131. Marder, supra note 54, at 888-890; Alschuler, supra note 3, at 890.
132. Id.
133. United States v. Dougherty, 473, F. 2d 1113, 1134 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
134. Alschuler, supra note 3, at 890-91.
135. Dougherty, 473 F.2d at 1130.
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B. Challenging Sparf" Jury Nullification in Response
to Contested Sentences
The only court that has directly challenged the holding in United
States v. Sparf was the District Court for the Eastern District of New
York in United States v. Polouizzi.13 6 In Polouizzi, there was no
question as to Polizzi's 37 factual guilt. 3 8 Jurors believed Polizzi
committed the crimes as they were charged but had serious concerns
regarding how Polizzi would be sentenced in light of Polizzi's
questionable mental health. 139 After three days of deliberation, the
jury rejected Polizzi's insanity defense and convicted him of all counts
charged in the indictment. 1
40
A post-verdict discussion with the jurors indicated that, even
though they had rejected the insanity defense, the jurors believed
Polizzi should not be imprisoned, but instead given mental health
treatment. 14 1 During this discussion with the jurors, the court informed
the jurors that the mandatory minimum sentence for Polizzi would be
five years. 142 After learning this, several jurors admitted that had they
known what the forthcoming sentence would be they would have
voted to find Polizzi not guilty by reason of insanity to prevent
Polizzi's incarceration. 143
Judge Weinstein's memorandum and order granting Polizzi a new
trial includes a detailed argument defending the jury's power to
nullify. 144 Judge Weinstein's order demonstrates a rare departure from
136. United States v. Polouizzi, 687 F. Supp. 2d 133 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) vacated
on other grounds, United States v. Polouizzi, 393 Fed. Appx. 784 (2d Cir. 2010).
The final Polouizzi decision was the result of a rather complicated procedural history
with little relevance to this comment. The specific opinion cited here dealing with
jury nullification was the result of a motion for a new trial based on juror comments
post-verdict. Id. at 137.
137. The spelling of the defendant's name within the opinion (Polizzi) differs
from the defendant's name in the case name (Polouizzi). See id. at 137.
138. Polouizzi, 687 F. Supp. 2d at 163-64.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 152.
141. Id. at 153.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 153.
144. Id. at 133.
180 [Vol. 52
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the trend exhibited in Part II where judges tend to view jury
nullification unfavorably. 145  In defending the practice, Judge
Weinstein insisted that the role of the jury must be determined by
looking at the intentions of the Framers in 1791 when they ratified the
Bill of Rights.146 Under this view, the jury has the power to acquit
regardless of the strength of the evidence, and it is entirely within the
jury's right to evaluate the justness of the forthcoming sentence when
determining guilt. 147 Judge Weinstein criticized negative depictions of
jury nullification as not supported by the history and intended purpose
of the Sixth Amendment.148
However, the court in Polouizzi failed to recognize an important
development in the American judicial system since the adoption of the
Sixth Amendment: judicial qualifications. 4 9 In the eighteenth and
early nineteenth centuries, there were not many trained lawyers and
judges in the United States. 150 In fact, many judges had no legal
training at all; instead their professions often included farming and
blacksmithing. 151 Absent legal qualifications, jurors were nearly as
suited to determine legal issues as the actual legal professionals. 152 As
the law became more comprehensive and complex, so did the requisite
training for judges. 153
Judge Weinstein did recognize that the right to trial by jury "was
expected to limit the kind of governmental overreaching that led to the
Revolutionary War."'154 One example of which was excessive
145. See Brown, supra note 58, at 1151-52.
146. United States v. Polouizzi, 687 F. Supp. 2d 133, 167 (E.D.N.Y. 2010)
vacated on other grounds, United States v. Polouizzi, 393 Fed. Appx. 784 (2d Cir.
2010) (stating that this is the majority approach of the United States Supreme Court
regarding the interpretation of the Sixth Amendment).
147. Id. at 168.
148. Id.
149. See id. at 133.
150. Alschuler, supra note 3, at 903-04.
151. Id. at 905, n.204.
152. Id. at 904.
153. Commonwealth v. Anthes, 71 Mass. 185, 198 (5 Gray 185) (1855).
154. United States v. Polouizzi, 687 F. Supp. 2d 133, 169 (E.D.N.Y. 2010)
vacated on other grounds, United States v. Polouizzi, 393 Fed. Appx. 784 (2d Cir.
2010).
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sentencing. 155 Currently, it is an ethical violation for an attorney to
argue a defendant will receive an excessive sentence if convicted
because sentencing decisions are solely within the purview of the
court and not relevant to the issue of guilt. 156 Such delineation of roles
between the judge and jury ensures that sentencing decisions can be
reviewed, allowing higher courts to amend sentences when
appropriate. 157 Applying a pre-Constitution analysis to modern jury
nullification ignores the procedural safeguards put in place to avoid
the type of governmental overreach that led to the Revolutionary War.
"The old rule [allowing juries to determine questions of law as well as
fact] survives today only as a singular relic."' 58
V. ARGUING FOR JURY NULLIFICATION IS ALWAYS IMPROPER
A. Meeting Standards of Relevance
In addition to the reasons articulated in Part IV, jury nullification
arguments are also improper because they do not pass the fundamental
evidentiary threshold of relevance. Jury nullification arguments can
never be relevant as prescribed by the rules of evidence. Attorneys'
arguments are not evidence, but a tool used to present the evidence in
the light most favorable to their position. 159 While the arguments
alone may not be evidence, if an attorney intends to argue for jury
nullification, the attorney may elicit some evidence during trial that is
only relevant to the nullification argument. To be presented to a jury,
evidence must be relevant. 160 Evidence is relevant if it has any
tendency to make any fact of consequence more or less likely to have
occurred. 161 The easiest way to determine if a fact is of consequence is
155. Id. at 170.
156. See Fairness to Opposing Counsel, MRPC Rule 3.4(e); see also Part
IV.A, infra.
157. Anthes, 71 Mass. at 195.
158. United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1133 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
159. See United States v. Macias, 32 F. App'x. 224, 226 (9th Cir. 2002)
(informing the jury that attorney arguments are not evidence mitigates prejudicial
effect of the arguments).
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to ask whether the fact is directly related to an element of a charge or
defense.
For example, turn back to the case discussed in the Introduction.
The jurisdiction in which the case was tried required the prosecution
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant possessed any
amount of a Schedule 1A controlled substance. 162 This can essentially
be broken down into three elements: (1) possession, (2) any amount,
and (3) a Schedule IA controlled substance. Facts of consequence
would relate to proving or disproving any of those three elements.
Because jury nullification arguments do not present facts related
to any elements of the offense, or any potential legal defense, the
arguments are not relevant. During the trial discussed in the
Introduction, the defense attorney focused on the minimal amount of
heroin in the defendant's possession and its potential effects (or lack
thereof) upon the user. This would ultimately provide the supposed
justification for nullification - if the defendant did not have enough
heroin to get high, what harm did the possession bring about? During
closing, defense counsel used an elephant metaphor to inform the jury
that they did not have to apply the law provided by the judge. 163 This
presentation of evidence and argument does not tend to make it more
or less likely that the defendant was (1) in possession of (2) any
amount of (3) heroin, a Schedule IA controlled substance. Therefore,
it was not relevant to that case. 164
The purpose of evidentiary rules is to ascertain the truth and to
promote the fair administration of justice.165 Encouraging jury
nullification during trial goes against these purposes. Jury nullification
attacks the law as applied to the defendant; not the case against the
defendant. Turning back to the example in the Introduction, the
defense attorney was not attacking the case against the defendant. He
did not question the veracity of the investigation, the credibility of the
witnesses, the crime lab's results, or the overall sufficiency of the
162. ALASKA STAT. § 11.71.040(a)(3) (2016).
163. See Introduction, supra.
164. It is important to reiterate the difference between arguing for jury
nullification and simply attempting to persuade the jury that the prosecution did not
meet its burden of proof. If an attorney is attacking the sufficiency of the evidence,
the argument is relevant to disproving a fact of consequence, and therefore, those
arguments are relevant.
165. See FED. R. EvID. 102; CAL. EvID. CODE § 2.
183
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evidence to support a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt. He
simply told the jurors they should acquit the defendant for no other
reason than because they could. There is no evidentiary justification
for such arguments because they do not meet the evidentiary threshold
of relevance.
B. Undermining the Separation of Powers
The legislative branches of government at both the federal and
state levels, as representative bodies, are responsible for enacting and
changing laws.1 66 Federal and state legislators, not jurors, are elected
by the People.' 67 The People determine the laws they want to be
bound by through their elected officials.168 The hijacking of laws by
unaccountable jurors undermines the system of checks and balances
that is the cornerstone of the American form of government. 169
The jury is an institution inherently within the realm of the
judicial branch. 170 The jury has no power to directly amend or repeal
laws, as that is the role of the legislative branch. 171 As such, the jury is
not truly a political institution with the prerogative to "nullify"
laws. 172 To have any effect beyond a single case, official changes to
purportedly unjust laws must be done by the legislature. While
colonial juries operated as a check on government power, it is now
generally recognized that the democratic process is a more valid
means for amending laws than the arbitrary decisions of jurors.1 73 The
consistent application of laws, not applications based on the arbitrary
whims of individual jurors, is as necessary to protect citizens against
anarchy as it is to protect against tyranny. 1
74
166. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, para. 18.
167. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.
168. See generally U.S. CONST. art. I.
169. See Brody, supra note 59, at 90 (political power within the United States
is separated between the three branches of government through a system of checks
and balances).
170. See U.S. CONST. art. III.
171. SeeU.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
172. Nullify, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
173. See United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1132 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
174. Seeid. at 1137.
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C. Ethical Implications ofArguing for Jury Nullification
As discussed in Part III, failure to argue for jury nullification is
not grounds for claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. 17 5 In fact,
arguing for jury nullification could actually have adverse ethical
implications for an attorney. 17 6 This comment argues that there should
be consequences for such action.
Jury nullification arguments require the attorney to argue, at least
implicitly, that his client did commit the crime, and then regardless of
that fact, ask the jury to acquit the defendant for some other reason. 177
This argument is implicitly prohibited under the rules of professional
conduct. 178
ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 3.4, entitled "Fairness
to Opposing Counsel," states:
A lawyer shall not.., in trial, allude to any matter that the lawyer
does not reasonably believe is relevant or that will not be supported
by admissible evidence, assert personal knowledge of facts in issue
except when testifying as a witness, or state a personal opinion as
to the justness of a cause, the credibility of a witness, the
culpability of a civil litigant or the guilt or innocence of an
accused. 179
All states except Alabama have adopted this portion of the rule and its
relevant parts with identical or similar language. 180 Accordingly,
arguing for jury nullification would theoretically violate the rules of
professional conduct.
Arguing for jury nullification violates Rule 3.4 in two ways. First,
the attorney alludes to something irrelevant or unsupported by the
175. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 695 (1984).
176. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, R. 3.4(e).
177. See Rebecca Love Koulis, Not Jury Nullification; Not a Call for Ethical
Reform; But Rather a Case for Judicial Control, 67 U. COLO. L. REv. 1109, 1115
(1996).
178. See Gunderson v. D.R. Horton, Inc., 319 P.3d 606, 613 (Nev. 2014).
179. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, R. 3.4(e) (emphasis added).
180. AMERICAN BAR Ass'N, VARIATIONS OF THE ABA MODEL RULES OF
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facts. Second, the attorney explicitly or implicitly asserts his or her
own opinion regarding the justness of his or her client's actions. 181 As
explained above in Part V(a), jury nullification arguments cannot be
relevant to the elements of a charge or defense; they are simply a last-
effort plea for acquittal.
Nullification defenses come in numerous forms. For example, the
defendant may regret and apologize for his actions; the defendant may
acknowledge that she fought with her boyfriend but that she had the
situation under control and did not want to involve the police; or the
defendant might argue that he should not be convicted of possessing
such a small amount of drugs.' 82 These defenses are irrelevant to the
determination of guilt,1 83 present personal opinions as to the justness
of the defendant's actions, and are not supported by the type of moral
justification envisaged by nullification proponents.1 84 Therefore, Rule
3.4 should be reworded to make clear that attorneys cannot argue for
nullification without violating the rules of professional conduct.
VI. ENSURING ATTORNEY ACCOUNTABILITY
An expanded use of jury nullification will lead to the destruction
of the rule of law because juries will determine which laws are
enforced and to whom they should apply. Bushell's Case and its
progeny protect jurors from being punished for rendering verdicts
contrary to the law.1 85 However, this protection does not, and should
not, extend to attorneys. As explained in Part V, jury nullification
arguments are always improper because they are not relevant, they
undermine the balance of power between the legislative and judicial
branches of government, and they implicitly violate the rules of
professional conduct. 186 Therefore, this comment recommends
amending Rule 3.4, and further recommends that states follow suit by
181. Gunderson v. D.R. Horton, Inc., 319 P.3d 606, 613 (Nev. 2014) (the
relevant Nevada rule of professional conduct mirrors MRPC 3.4(e)).
182. These examples are based on actual arguments I have personally
witnessed in different trials with different defense attorneys.
183. See Part V.A, supra.
184. See Part IV, supra.
185. See Duvall, supra note 13.
186. See Part V, supra.
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amending their respective rules to explicitly prohibit jury nullification
arguments in criminal trials.
As written, the ABA Model Rules do not specifically prohibit jury
nullification. The American Bar Association recognizes that
"[d]efense counsel should not make arguments calculated to appeal to
the prejudices of the jury" or make arguments "which would divert the
jury from its duty to decide the case on the evidence."18 7 However, the
ABA does not intend these standards to be used as criteria for
misconduct, 188 so they are insufficient to guide attorney conduct or
ensure attorney accountability. Jury nullification arguments are,
therefore, frowned upon but not truly prohibited. I 89 A true prohibition
of such arguments is necessary to maintain the integrity of the
criminal trial process.
Model Rule 3.4 should be amended to include the following
language: "A lawyer shall not, in criminal trials,' 90 either explicitly or
implicitly, encourage members of the jury to disregard the law
supplied to them by the judge." This amendment would not prohibit
jury nullification itself. Rules of professional conduct only apply to
lawyers, so the amendment would not affect jurors wishing to nullify.
Prohibiting jury nullification would not be enforceable because jurors
cannot be held accountable for their verdicts. However, attorneys can
be held accountable for arguing for jury nullification. The argument
for jury nullification and the actual act of doing so are separate; the
proposed amendment only deals with the arguments made by lawyers.
The suggested rule also covers both explicit and implicit jury
nullification arguments. As noted earlier, judges generally disapprove
of explicit jury nullification arguments like the elephant argument
discussed in the Introduction. However, not all jury nullification
arguments are so explicit and obvious. Implicit arguments can still be
destructive and threaten the integrity of the criminal trial process. It is,
therefore, important to prohibit both explicit and implicit jury
nullification arguments.
187. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 4-7.7 (1993).
188. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 4-7.1 (1993).
189. See STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 4-7.7 (1993).
190. This comment limits the analysis of jury nullification arguments to the
context of criminal trials. Whether a similar rule is necessary for civil trials is
beyond the scope of this comment. Therefore, the proposed language for an
amended Model Rule 3.4 is limited to criminal trials.
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In addition, the language is not overly broad or vague. It clearly
encompasses jury nullification but does not go so far as to forbid other
permissible forms of argument.
The purpose of amending this rule is not to create additional
sanctions for attorneys, but to streamline the process already in place
for punishing violations of the rules of professional conduct. An
explicit prohibition will be easier to enforce than an implicit one.
Currently, under Model Rule 3.4, judges have much discretion to
determine when attorneys cross the line into irrelevance or personal
opinion without having to specifically address jury nullification. The
proffered rule amendment specifies a particular form of prohibited
argument, which, if accepted, would bring more predictability and
consistency in the enforcement of the rules of professional conduct.
CONCLUSION
Jury nullification itself cannot be prohibited. 191 As a matter of
practicality, courts must tolerate jury nullification to protect the
independence of the jury deliberation process. However, just because
jurors cannot be punished for exercising the power to nullify, does not
mean attorneys should not be punished for making jury nullification
arguments.
Jury nullification should not be encouraged because it impedes the
fair and impartial administration of justice. Encouraging jury
nullification is to encourage disrespect and contempt for the rule of
law. Courts should not be granted the discretion to allow attorneys to
encourage jury nullification. The rules of professional conduct should
be amended to explicitly prohibit jury nullification arguments in
criminal trials.
There was a reason the elephant was tied to a stake. While
everyone likes the elephant, no one wants it rampaging through the
fair unrestrained. Juries, like elephants, have great power, and at
times, that power must be harnessed to ensure just and fair results.
Whereas elephants are restrained by a rope, juries are restrained by the
191. See United States v. Thomas, 116 F.3d 606, 623 (2d Cir. 1997) ("Where
the duty and authority to prevent defiant disregard of the law or evidence comes into
conflict with the principle of secret jury deliberations, we are compelled to err in the
favor of the lesser of two evils protecting the secrecy of jury deliberations at the
expense of possibly allowing irresponsible juror activity").
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law. Expansive encouragement of jury nullification will destroy any
notion of predictability in the criminal justice system. Thus, attorneys
should be prohibited from encouraging juries to ignore the law when
deciding the issue of guilt in a criminal trial.
Kimberly Del Frate*
* California Western School of Law, J.D. candidate, 2017. University of
Alaska Anchorage, B.A., Justice, 2014. I would like to thank my family, friends, and
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